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 The results of previous studies demonstrated that 
the need for cognitive closure (NFC), defined as a need to 
have any answer on a given topic, as opposed to further 
ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) corresponds with 
individual differences in the ability to handle interference 
(Kossowska, 2007a; Kossowska, Orehek & Kruglanski, 
2010). In the present study we validated this finding using 
NFC manipulations via time pressure and goal activation. 
We focused specifically on these two types of NFC 
inductions, as previous results suggested, that they may not 
only affect epistemic motivation, but also influence other 
aspects of knowledge formation, in particular cognitive 
capacity (Bukowski, von Hecker & Kossowska, 2013).  
Individual differences in need for closure and executive 
control
 NFC has been described as the tendency to reduce 
the feeling of discomfort experienced in the face of cognitive 
uncertainty through quick formulation of a hypothesis and its 
short validation (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals 
high in dispositional NFC are characterized by a preference 
for order and for predictability in their lives, afforded 
by secure and stable knowledge that is reliable across 
circumstances and unchallenged by exceptions. High NFC 
individuals also experience an urgent desire to reach swift 
and firm decisions, reflected in their need for decisiveness, 
and they feel discomfort with ambiguity, experiencing 
situations lacking closure as aversive. Finally, they are 
closed-minded, resistant to information inconsistent with 
their firm opinions, and reluctant to have their knowledge 
challenged. It is also well documented that the cognitive 
processes used by high-need-for-closure individuals to 
reduce uncertainty are category-based, nonsystematic, and 
heuristic. In contrast, individuals with low levels of need 
for closure prefer to reduce uncertainty by using piecemeal 
or individuation processes. This preference is manifested 
in vigilant behavior that is based on a systematic and 
effortful search for relevant information, its evaluation, and 
its unbiased assimilation (Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, 
& Pierro, 2009; Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, & Tabak, 1997; 
Driscoll, Hamilton, & Sorrentino, 1991). 
 The previous research allowed one to conclude 
that the tendency of individuals high in the NFC to focus 
or ‘freeze’ on a specific region of the cognitive field 
(i.e. on specific categories, or concepts) represents a 
compensatory mechanism developed in order to make 
up for their cognitive-capacity limitations, and affording 
superior cognitive selectivity and the ability to shut out 
irrelevant distractions and noise (Kossowska, 2007a,b; 
Kossowska et al., 2010). They also revealed that NFC 
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reduces the incidence of uncertainty, conflict, and error 
because it motivates to achieve closure that successfully 
accommodate experience, results in zealous goal pursuit 
that narrows attention away from discrepancy, or provides 
rigid predictions that assimilate inconsistent observations 
(Kossowska et al., 2010; Amodio, Jost, Masters & Yee, 
2008; Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh & Ash, 2009). 
 These are important findings as efficient control 
processes are essential in all situations in which a clear 
and stable picture has to be distilled from a fuzzy and 
complex stimulus configuration (e.g. Dijksterhuis, Van 
Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). Executive 
control is responsible for stopping reactions on new, 
conflicting, or irrelevant information, i.e., which could 
violate coherence and stability of the knowledge system, 
from further processing. By reducing the probability that 
contradictory, new or inconsistent information is encoded, 
perception is guided effectively toward a relatively clear-
cut, unambiguous impression, judgment, or opinion (Miller 
& Cohen, 2001; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000).  Thus, executive control may be seen 
as process responsible for different social effects related 
to NFC, as, among others, impression primacy effect 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983;  Freund, Kruglanski, & 
Schpitzaijzen, 1985; Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), 
the tendency to base judgments on prevalent stereotypes 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989), and to 
assimilate numerical estimates to anchor values (Kruglanski 
& Freund, 1983), increases overattribution bias (Webster, 
1993a), mere exposure effects (Kruglanski, Freund, & Bar-
Tal, 1996) or the effects of priming (e.g. Ford & Kruglanski, 
1995). 
Need for closure induction and executive control
 NFC usually treated as individual characteristic, 
it is also seen as a motivational tendency that may be 
induced situationally (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). A most 
straightforward instigator of high NFC is time pressure 
(e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983, Richter & Kruglanski, 
1998; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). However, various situations 
wherein information processing is difficult, laborious, or 
aversive can also result in a heightened desire for closure. 
For example, if the task at hand is dull or of low interest 
(e.g., Webster, 1993a), if performance is impeded by 
external stressors such as environmental noise (e.g., 
Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), or if processing is 
felt to be laborious due to fatigue (e.g., Webster et al., 
1996) or intoxication (e.g., Webster, 1993b), people may 
also experience an increased desire to reach closure (see 
Kruglanski, 2004, Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, for an 
overview). 
 Although the effects of experimentally induced 
NFC have been repeatedly cross-validated with converging 
effects of individual differences in dispositional NFC, 
and vice versa (e.g., Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Melon, 2000; 
Roets, Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Soetens,  2008; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994), the influence of situationally induced 
NFC on information processing in the task involving 
executive control was never tested.  Moreover, these 
cross-validations do not preclude the possibility that some 
particular NFC manipulations do not only affect epistemic 
motivation, but also influence other aspects of knowledge 
formation, in particular cognitive capacity thus influence on 
the ability to handle interference. 
 On the one hand, Roets et al. (2008) found that 
in addition to their motivational effect on the extent of 
information sampling, both noise and time pressure also 
affected performance in the easy versions of the task. 
The researchers suggest that noise and time pressure 
manipulations indeed yield a “double effect” on both 
motivation and cognitive capacity. On the other hand, 
Bukowski and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that the 
type of NFC manipulation (by external vs internal time 
constraints) has a differential impact on the two aspects 
of knowledge creation: consistency of currently processed 
information with background knowledge and timing 
of presentation of information, while reasoning about 
social relations. That research revealed, that externally 
(environmentally) imposed time pressure accompanied by 
difficult task conditions (e.g., late presentation of diagnostic 
information that imposes a load on working memory) 
resulted in a tendency to prematurely terminate the reasoning 
process and to form more erroneous representations. 
Impaired reasoning in external time pressure conditions 
should therefore be related to cognitive demands imposed 
by the reasoning task itself. However, if cognitive closure 
motive was activated via internal standards (by emphasizing 
the value of quick vs. accurate reasoning strategies), the 
reliance on information consistent with background 
knowledge was a predominant processing strategy. These 
results suggest the functional differences of these two types 
of NFC manipulations. Specifically, these results revealed 
that the time pressure manipulation created an external 
constraint that affected specifically the speed of information 
processing and thus also impaired the ability of participants 
to process the information presented late in the sequence. In 
contrast, the NFC goal activation manipulation activated a 
representation of the task in which the task was an important 
evaluation of one’s social abilities and induced a mind-set 
of seeking simple (vs. more complex) reasoning strategies. 
This goal-based, purely motivational manipulation affected 
mainly the reliance on category consistent (vs. inconsistent) 
information, whereas the timing of the presentation of the 
diagnostic relation was relatively less affected. 
 Thus, in this paper we aimed to examine, whether 
NFC induced via time pressure and goal activation, 
influences performance in basic attentional tasks that involve 
executive control, i.e., the Stroop task (1935) and the Social 
Category Switching Tasks (SCST, Marzecová, Bukowski, 
Boros, Correa, Lupiáñez, & Wodniecka, 2013). We focus 
on these two tasks as, on the one hand, they both required 
the ability to inhibit dominant or prepotent responses, on 
the other hand, they differ in complexity, difficulty and 
type of stimuli used (words vs faces). Thus, we may gain 
an insight in executive control processes when performing 
cognitive tasks differed also in content  (socially relevant vs. 
irrelevant). We predicted that elevated NFC will be related 
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to more efficient performance in both tasks. Those effects 
should be more pronounced in the Stroop task than SCST, 
as the latter is more complex. This expectation is consistent 
with previous findings showing that individuals with a high 
NFC display a more efficient selectivity in the absence of 
load than do those with a low NFC (Kossowska, 2007b). 
However, even though high (vs. low) NFC individuals tend 
to perform better on a task involving selective attention, 
they perform more poorly on the same task than their 
low NFC counterparts, once the performers’ resources 
are additionally taxed by apparent fatigue (Kossowska, 
2007b). In addition, we hypothesized that time pressure 
and goal activation manipulations of NFC will influence 
performance in the same direction, that is, consistently 
with the first prediction, induced NFC levels will facilitate 
performance in tasks measuring basic executive functions 
of attention. Previous results showed impaired performance 
after induction of high NFC, but measuring more complex, 
integrative cognitive functions involved in reasoning about 
social relations (Bukowski et al., 2013). However, in this 
study we measure performance in basic attentional tasks, 
in which closure motives might enhance performance by 
the active maintenance of a single task goal in the face of 
distraction (Altamirano, Miyake, & Whitmer, 2010). 
Method
Participants
 One hundred female1 and 11 male students 
participated in the study (aged 19 - 37, M = 21.87; SD = 
2.56, one participant did not provide information concerning 
her age). Data from one subjects was excluded from the 
analyses because of the lack of experimental manipulation. 
Data from two subjects in the Stroop task were not coded, 
due to equipment malfunction. All of the participants 
were university students from Krakow, Poland. They were 
recruited through university classes or participant pool. 
Subjects recruited through classes received course credits 
while subjects from the pool were paid 5 euros. 
Procedure 
 Participants were told that they were to participate 
in a study on individual differences in information 
processing. Each subject was seated in front of a computer 
screen and asked to follow experimenter instructions. 
Procedure included completing the two computer-based 
experimental tasks: color-naming Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) 
and Social Category Switching Task (Marzecová et al., 
2013). Participants received an experimental manipulation 
inducing high or low NFC through time pressure or goal 
activation. 
 Time-pressure manipulation of NFC. In the 
time pressure condition participants were told that there 
is maximum time limit for performing two experimental 
tasks and that they would not be informed about the time 
left for the tasks. However, participants were warned that if 
they exceeded this interval they would be required to take 
another task. They were advised to perform experimental 
tasks as quickly as possible. In the no time pressure 
condition participants were informed that there is a minimal 
time requirement for the tasks and if they did not reach this 
minimal interval they just end the procedure. Accordingly, 
they were asked to complete experimental tasks as carefully 
as possible. 
 Goal-based manipulation of NFC. In both 
condition of goal-based manipulation participants were 
informed that all experimental tasks were designed to 
assess one facet of their cognitive performance. In high 
NFC condition instruction stated that research in the field 
of cognitive psychology clearly showed that “people with 
high levels of IQ respond quickly and do not analyze 
given information deeply. Thus, try to respond quickly in 
the subsequent tasks. Work as quickly as you can”. While 
participants in low NFC condition were given an instruction 
informing that cognitive psychology research demonstrated 
that “people with high levels of IQ work carefully and 
analyze incoming information thoroughly, even if it takes 
them more time. Thus, try to respond carefully in the 
subsequent tasks. Work as accurately as you can, do not 
worry about the time.” 
 Color-naming Stroop task. Computerized version 
of color-naming Stroop task (1935) consisted of series 
of color words. The color of a presented stimulus word 
could be either congruent or incongruent with its semantic 
meaning. Participants were instructed to name the ink color 
of a presented word and to neglect its meaning. Subjects 
responded to each stimulus using computer keyboard (in 
a practice block they were asked to memorize which key 
represent respective color). The experimental trials were 
presented in a fixed random order. After 24 practice trials, 
participants were given 144 experimental trials. In each trial 
stimulus word was presented for 200 ms; the maximum 
time for response was restricted to 2200 ms. In practice 
block stimuli were presented until participant responded 
to it. The 2/3 of stimuli were the congruent ones while 
remaining 1/3 incongruent ones. Previous studies  (Tzelgov, 
Henik, & Berger, 1992; West & Alain, 2000) demonstrated 
that as the proportion of congruent stimuli increases, the 
prolonged response latency for incongruent stimuli (i.e. 
Stroop effect) increases. Despite the debate concerning the 
specific mechanism of this effect (e.g. Blais & Bunge, 2010; 
Schmidt & Besner, 2008) there is no doubt that task with 
small proportion of incongruent elicit more conflict. Thus, 
the task is more difficult for participants and this potentially 
protect against the ceiling effect. Stimuli were presented 
using DMDX software (Forster & Forster, 2003).
 Social Category Switching Task (SCST) tests 
the ability of switching between two social categories 
and was previously used to assess differences in cognitive 
flexibility (Marzecová et al., 2013). In this task participants 
categorised pictures of human faces, according to one 
of two social categories: gender (female vs. male) or 
age (young vs. old). Eight black and white photographs, 
1 It is worth noticing that the participant sample was largely gender biased, but some studies demonstrated that there are no gender differences in 
performing such elementary task as the Stroop task or switching tasks (Li, Zhang, Duann, Yan, Sinha, & Mazure, 2009)
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depicting a young female, an old female, a young male, 
and an old male (two pictures for each category), were 
selected from The Center for Vital Longevity Face Database 
(Minear & Park, 2004). All of the photographs were placed 
in the centre of the screen and had the same, following 
properties: 7.41 cm width and 6.74 cm height. A cue in the 
form of a coloured frame (green or purple) was presented to 
inform participants about which task (either gender or age 
categorisation) to perform. The colour - task combination 
was counterbalanced. The task was programmed in E-prime 
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
 Each trial in the procedure started with the 
presentation of a fixation cross for 1000 ms. Afterwards, 
the target picture, framed with either the green or the purple 
coloured frame, was presented in the middle of the screen. 
The cue and the target remained on the screen until the 
participant responded, or for a maximum duration of 3000 
ms. After incorrect responses, a beep was presented and the 
next trial followed after 1500 ms. Participants responded 
using both hands. The “z” and “m” keys were used to respond 
to the gender task, whereas the age task was performed 
was performed with “x” and “n” keys. The matching of 
keys to category exemplars was counterbalanced across 
participants. Participants were given written instructions on 
the screen explaining the matching of keys and the tasks. 
The task contained with 8 practice trials, followed by four 
experimental blocks consisting of 80 trials each. The stimuli 
were presented in a random order to each participant.
Results
Stroop Task
 In order to calculate the results for reaction 
time latencies, the incorrect as well as missed responses 
were excluded from further analyses (18,7%). Moreover 
participants with accuracy lower than the chance level (in 
this case 25%) either for congruent or incongruent stimuli 
were excluded from the sample (eleven participants). Thus, 
in statistical analyzes data from 98 participants remained 
(47 subjects in goal activation condition, 46 females; and 
51 in time-pressure condition, 42 females). 
 First we checked the overall performance on the 
Stroop task, comparing the reaction times for congruent 
(M =  685.99 ms) to incongruent (M = 829.84 ms) trials, 
and verifying the classic Stroop effect (t(97)= -14.67, p < 
.001). The same pattern of results was found for accuracy 
scores – participants performed the task more accurately in 
congruent (M = 88%) than in incongruent (M = 78%) trials 
(t(97) = 8.07, p < .001).
 Further, we conducted a repeated measure 
ANOVA on response times with one within-subject factors: 
Congruency (Congruent vs. Incongruent trials), and one 
between-subjects factor, NFC level (high vs. low) for each 
of the two NFC manipulations separately (time pressure 
and goal activation). For the goal manipulation, the effect 
of NFC level manipulations turned out to be marginally 
significant (F(1,45) = 3.62, p = .064, η2p = .074), We did not 
find significant interaction effect between trial congruence 
and NFC level (F(1,45) = 1.84, p = .181, η2p = .039). The 
same analyzes were repeated for the accuracy as dependent 
variable. None of the effects reached statistical significance. 
For time-pressure manipulations, we found the main effect 
of NFC level (F(1,49) =7.89, p < .01, η2p = .139), with 
participants in high NFC condition performing task faster 
than subjects in low NFC condition (congruent trials: Mhigh 
= 629.62 ms, Mlow  = 740.57 ms; incongruent trials: Mhigh 
= 716.81 ms, Mlow  = 869.45 ms, for low and high NFC 
subjects, respectively). This effect however was qualified 
by marginally significant 2-way interaction between trial 
congruence and NFC level (F(1,49) = 3.09, p = .085, η2p= 
.059). The same analyzes were repeated for the accuracy (% 
of accurate responses) as a dependent variable. None of the 
effects reached statistical significance (F < 1). 
 Overall analyzes. Based on the theory, we 
expected that both types of NFC manipulation (i.e., time 
pressure and goal activation) will influence the task 
performance in the same direction. Moreover, the analyses 
conducted separately for each type of NFC manipulation 
did not provide any significant results for low vs. high NFC 
participants. Thus we decided to analyze data obtained 
from both groups with different manipulations together to 
increase the test power.    
 Response times to congruent and incongruent 
trials were analyzed in a 2 (Congruency: Congruent vs. 
Incongruent; within participants) x 2 (NFC level: high vs. 
low, between participants) x 2 (Type of NFC manipulation: 
time pressure vs. goal activation, between participants) 
mixed model ANOVA. We found a significant main effect 
of the NFC level (F(1,94) = 10.13, p = .002, η2p = .097). 
This main effect was qualified by a 2-way interaction effect 
between NFC level and congruence of the trial (F(1,94) 
= 4.70, p = .033, η2p = .048), showing a less pronounced 
difference in reaction times for congruent and incongruent 
trials in high vs. low NFC participants. In other words, the 
Stroop effect was weaker in conditions of induced high NFC 
(difference in means between congruent and incongruent 
trials = 123,46 ms) than in low NFC (difference in means 
between congruent and incongruent trials = 166,26 ms). We 
did not find a three-way interaction effect 2 (Congruency) x 
2 (induced NFC level) x 2 (Type of NFC manipulation) for 
reaction times. 
 The same analysis was repeated for the accuracy 
(%) as dependent variable.  We found marginal main effects 
of NFC level manipulations (F(1,94) = 2.65, p = .11, η2p = 
.027) with more accurate responses of participants in high 
NFC than low NFC condition ( Mhigh = 86%, Mlow  = 81%). 
Social Category Switching Task
 Erroneous and missed responses, RTs shorter 
than 200 and higher than 2000 ms, as well as RTs from the 
first trial of each block were excluded from the analysis of 
response times (altogether 10,7 %). Two participants were 
excluded from final analyses due to a very low percentage 
of accurate responses, which might be related to a random 
response tendency or misunderstanding of the instructions 
(accuracy rates below 44 % of correct responses). Firstly, 
we checked the overall performance in the SCST and found 
the expected main effect of switching, that is longer reaction 
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times for switch (M = 1033 ms) than non-switch trials (M = 
893 ms) (F(1,108) = 338.4, p < .001, η2p = .76). 
 Further, we conducted a repeated measure ANOVA 
with two within-subject factors: Task Switch (task switch 
vs. no switch) and Repetition Type (alternation vs. complete 
repetition vs. partial repetition of stimuli), and one between-
subjects factor, NFC level (high vs. low) for each of the 
two NFC manipulations separately (time pressure and goal 
activation). For the goal manipulation, we did not find a 
three-way interaction (F < 1) and we found a tendency in 
the switch x NFC level interaction (F(1,52) = 2.81, p = .099, 
η2p = .05), indicating a worse performance after low NFC 
induction in switch (vs. non-switch) trials. For the time 
pressure manipulation we did neither find a significant 
switch x repetition type x NFC level interaction (F(1,52) = 
1.76, p = .18, η2p = .03), nor a two way switch x NFC level 
interaction (F(1,52) = 1.98, p = .16, η2p = .04). However, 
both interactions revealed a weak statistical trend going in 
the same direction as in the goal manipulation (i.e. worse 
performance following low NFC induction).
 Since the effects for both types of manipulations 
were analogous, in order to check for the role of a specific 
NFC manipulation and to compare it with the overall 
effect of NFC level, we conducted one repeated measure 
ANOVA with two within-subject factors: Task Switch (task 
switch vs. no switch) and Repetition Type (alternation vs. 
complete repetition vs. partial repetition of stimuli), and 
two between-subjects factors: Type of NFC manipulation 
(time pressure vs. goal activation) and NFC level (high vs. 
low). We found a marginal main effect of the NFC level 
manipulation, showing overall faster reaction times in the 
switching task after high NFC (M = 938 ms) relatively to 
low NFC induction (M = 988 ms) (F(1,105) = 3.49, p = .06, 
η2p = .04). 
 We did not find a four-way interaction effect (F < 
1). However, a two-way repeated measure ANOVA revealed 
a significant interaction between Task Switch and NFC level 
(F(1,105) = 4.78, p = .031, η2p = .04). Pairwise comparisons 
(Sidak) showed that after situationally induced high (vs. 
low) NFC participants reacted faster in trials in which a 
category switch was required (Mhigh NFC = 999 ms, Mlow 
NFC = 1067 ms; F(1,105) = 4.47, p = .037, η2p = .04). The 
same comparison for non-switch trials was not significant 
(Mhigh NFC = 876 ms, Mlow NFC = 911 ms; F(1,105) = 
2.04, p = .16, η2p = .02). In sum, reaction times analyses 
revealed smaller switching costs after high than low NFC 
manipulations. We have also found a non-significant effect 
for the switch x NFC manipulation condition (F(1,105) = 
2.70, p = .10, η2p = .02). 
 We have also performed analogous analyses for the 
accuracy measure. The four-way, Task Switch x Repetition 
Type x Type of NFC manipulation x NFC level did not yield 
significance (F < 1). However, a significant interaction 
between Repetition Type and NFC level was observed 
(F(1,104) = 3.4, p = .035, η2p = .03), which indicated that 
in high NFC conditions participants were less accurate in 
conditions that involved stimulus change (e.g. change from a 
young woman to an old woman) in comparison to conditions 
not involving stimulus change. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that this effect was mainly pronounced when 
the stimulus changed completely (complete alternation 
condition, M = .90, SD = .01) or partially (partial repetition, 
M = .90, SD = .01) relatively to the complete repetition 
condition, when the stimulus remained the same (complete 
repetition, M = .93, SD = .01) (F(1,104) = 12.44, p < .001, 
η2p = .2). Participants in low NFC conditions did not show 
this pattern and responded on a comparable level to all types 
of repetitions (F(1,104) = 1.87, p = .16, η2p = .03). In other 
words, the accuracy of responses after high NFC induction 
was more sensitive to the type of stimulus repetition, in 
a way, that any change in the stimulus type evoked more 
erroneous reactions, whereas after low NFC induction the 
accuracy level was more stable across task conditions.  
Discussion
 Several studies have provided evidence for the 
conclusion that NFC as individual characteristic is associated 
with better performance in tasks involved executive control 
functions (Kossowska, 2007 a, b; Kossowska et al., 2010). 
However, what is missing in those studies is a consideration 
of state-dependent influences. Thus, in order to validate the 
previous findings, we focused on examining the effect of 
time pressure and goal activation on executive control, 
as research demonstrated that these two types of NFC 
manipulation influence different aspects of knowledge 
formation process (Bukowski et al., 2013). However, we 
expected that these two types of NFC manipulations would 
induce a similar pattern of responses in Stroop task and 
SCST for high vs. low NFC conditions. Thus, taking all 
data into account (from time pressure and goal activation 
manipulations) we focused only on the differences between 
the levels of NFC. 
 Consistently with our hypothesis, indeed we 
found that NFC, evoked by both, time pressure and goal 
activation, improved performance on two tasks that involve 
executive control. Generally speaking, in the Stroop task 
high (vs. low) NFC participants demonstrated weaker 
Stroop effect and in the SCST, they also exhibited smaller 
switching costs. In the light of these results we may suggest 
that high (vs. low) NFC is associated with higher ability to 
handle with interference. It is important to notice that those 
results were obtained only when reaction times were taken 
into account. However, the results from the switching task 
reveal an interesting possibility that there are some hidden 
costs of increased efficiency of induced high NFC, namely 
the effectiveness of performance (response accuracy in 
particular stimulus repetition conditions) decreased in 
those task conditions, which involved stimulus change. This 
result resembles a trade-off pattern, in which hight NFC 
participants compensate impaired processing efficiency 
with additional effort devoted to the task, yet the accuracy 
results do not encompass the category switching variable, 
which is central for the results obtained for reaction time 
latencies. Additionally, in the Stroop task we did not find 
any confirmation for the trade-off hypothesis. Therefore 
the interpretation of higher costs of increased efficiency 
amongst high NFC participants should be considered with 
caution and requires further research.
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 Although, we are aware that the way we treat two 
types of manipulations could rise some controversies, the 
results we obtained are important not only because they 
are validating the previous findings. They also indicated 
the “bright side” of NFC. Many studies have proven the 
tendency of high NFC people to become stuck in a certain 
inflexible mind-set. Although mental inflexibility is often 
disadvantageous (especially when the situation calls for 
rapidly shifting between goals), it can be advantageous 
when successful performance requires active maintenance 
of a particular goal despite distracting stimuli or competing 
goals. In such situations, such mental “stickiness” of 
individuals high in NFC may help to prevent that goal from 
easily slipping out of working memory. Previous research 
showed improved selective attention under stress, due to 
an enhanced selectivity to task-relevant attributes because 
of reduced utilization of task-irrelevant attributes (Chajut 
& Algom, 2003; Kossowska, 2007a, b). In a similar vein, 
our research showed that when external demands in a form 
of time pressure are present or the subjective relevance 
of cognitive closure goals is high, then cognitive conflict 
resolution might be more efficient due to a more selective 
attentional focus on filtering out the irrelevant information. 
At the same time, it could be predicted that there is an optimal 
level of time related stress for performance on cognitive 
tasks, which can be depicted by a curve-linear relation, 
that is when the external demands (e.g. time pressure, task 
complexity) increase, then the efficiency of using a simple 
filtering strategy might be reduced (Zivnuska, Kiewitz, 
Hochwater, Perrewe, & Zellars, 2002; Kossowska 2007b).
 Interestingly, our study revealed analogous 
effects of both closure manipulations on performance in 
tasks assessing executive control. However, it is worth 
emphasizing the differences between performance of 
high NFC people in both executive tasks. The accuracy 
of responses after high NFC induction in SCST was more 
sensitive to the type of stimulus repetition, in a way, that 
any change in the stimulus type evoked more erroneous 
reactions, whereas after low NFC induction the accuracy 
level was more stable across task conditions. This result 
might suggest that there were some costs of quicker reaction 
times in switch and non-switch trials in a form of less 
accurate performance but only when the stimuli changed 
to a greater degree, introducing in a certain way more noise 
to the task. In other words, any changes in the goal shifting 
rules resulted in decreased performance of high NFC 
individuals. One explanation of those results may be linked 
to sensitivity of high NFC people to increased difficulty of 
the task. As it was previously demonstrated even though 
high (vs. low) need for closure individuals tend to perform 
better on a tasks involving selective attention, they perform 
more poorly on the same task than their low need for 
closure counterparts, once the performers’ resources are 
additionally taxed by difficulties (Kossowska, 2007b). In 
sum, the results obtained in the SCST show that although 
elevated NFC leads to smaller switching costs (related 
to overall faster reaction times), in more complex task 
conditions, that involve rule changes, this facilitation is at 
the cost of diminished response accuracy. 
 An alternative explanation of this result stresses 
the dissociation between two goal-neglect tasks, which 
were used in the study. Although both tasks were designed 
to measure executive control, one emphasized goal 
maintenance (Stroop), the other emphasized goal shifting 
(SCST). Thus these two tasks differ in degree to which 
people’s cognitive processing is geared toward flexibility 
(goal shifting) or stability (goal maintenance). And of course, 
cognitive processing of high (vs. low) NFC individuals 
may inherently be geared more toward goal maintenance 
than toward goal shifting. Thus, it could be expected that 
when goal shifting rules become more difficult, then the 
advantage stemming from higher levels of NFC might 
turn into a disadvantage, leading to more erroneous or 
biased responses. This issue calls for examination in future 
research.
 Relating the results obtained in our present study 
to some previous findings on the impact of different closure 
manipulations on cognitive performance, it might be stated, 
that there are two routes to closure which depending on 
the type of task requirements can have uniform or diverse 
effects on performance. If the task requires the execution 
of clear, non-ambiguous rules (e.g. name the color of the 
font and ignore the meaning of the word), then even if this 
activity involves effortful and systematic processing, then 
high levels of NFC might help to execute it. However, if 
the task requires paying attention to more complex and 
multiple rules (e.g. integrate various sources of information 
into a coherent mental model) then high levels of NFC can 
decrease performance (Bukowski et al., 2013; Bukowski, 
Sędek, Kossowska, & Trejtowicz, 2012; Kossowska, 
2007a, b). Another important difference between this 
research and some previous studies is that the effects 
obtained here mainly refer to reaction times latencies in 
reacting to relatively easy categorizable stimuli (color, 
gender, age), whereas some previous studies showed the 
biasing nature of high NFC on the focus and preference for 
background knowledge consistent information (Kruglanski 
et al., 2009). An intriguing and couter-intuitive general 
conclusion that seems to follow from this research is that 
high NFC levels might only lead to its adverse effects on 
information processing, when the environment is complex 
or unstructured leading to the preference of knowledge 
consistent structures but when the task rules are structured 
and well-defined then high levels of closure can boost 
performance also when managing with cognitive conflict 
and inconsistency is involved. Therefore, in future research, 
examining the joint impact of the type of closure induction 
and complexity of task rules on performance seems an 
interesting line to follow.
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